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PORNOSHOPPED:  WHY CALIFORNIA SHOULD 
ADOPT THE FEDERAL STANDARD  
FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Brian Yamada* 
 
In 2011, Joseph Gerber was convicted for possession of child pornog-
raphy under California Penal Code section 311.11 when he photo-edited his 
13-year-old daughter’s face onto the bodies of adult women.  However, the 
6th District of the California Court of Appeal reversed his conviction be-
cause the language of the statute required the child to “personally” engage in 
the depicted conduct.  As a result, in California it is very difficult to success-
fully prosecute morphed child pornography (where a picture of a real child 
is manipulated into an unidentifiable minor).  In addition, the ability of sec-
tion 311.11 to protect children is substantially diminished in comparison to 
the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation 
of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act).  Therefore, this Comment propos-
es that California should adopt its own version of the PROTECT Act (“Cal-
Pro”).  It should have narrow language and a flexible sentencing scheme 
that recognizes the state’s overcrowding epidemic.  With these modifica-
tions, Cal-Pro strikes a balance between the goal of the Realignment Plan to 
reduce prison overcrowding and maximizing the protection of our children. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the digital age, computer programs such as Adobe Photoshop are 
used to create works of art.1  Some people use the program for more selfish 
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purposes such as fixing unwanted defects in personal photographs or digital-
ly inserting themselves into a picture with someone they admire.2  Recently, 
Joseph Gerber used such technology for a more deviant purpose—editing 
pornographic photos of adult women to include the face of his 13-year-old 
daughter.3  Initially, Gerber was convicted of possession of child pornogra-
phy, but his conviction was overturned on appeal.4  The California Court of 
Appeal for the Sixth District concluded that the photographs were more simi-
lar to virtual child pornography and held that the mere possession of virtual 
pornography was protected by the First Amendment.5 
In Gerber, it was clear that no real child was used in the depicted sex 
acts,6 but what happens when the subject cannot be conclusively classified as 
real or virtual?  Morphed child pornography is a type of virtual pornography 
where the creator takes a photograph of a real child and manipulates the im-
age into an unidentifiable minor.7  Morphed pornography creates a problem 
for prosecutors because the prosecution must prove that an image is a real 
child by identifying the specific child or the origin of the image.8  To meet 
this high burden of proof, expert witnesses are required.9  However, even ex-
perts struggle to distinguish real images from virtual images as a result of so-
phisticated image-altering techniques.10  For example, one technique disguis-
es pictures of real children by making them appear computer-generated.11  
                                                            
1.  See 50 Images for Fans of Photoshop Art, PHOTOGRAPHY SCHS. ONLINE (Apr. 8, 
2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.photographyschoolsonline.net/blog/2010/50-images-for-fans-of-
photoshop-art/. 
2.  See Tara Parker-Pope, Losing Weight by Photoshop, N.Y. TIMES WELL (Dec. 17, 2009, 
11:36 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/losing-weight-by-photoshop/; see also Fi-
lonia LeChat, How to Photoshop Yourself With a Celebrity, EHOW.COM (last updated June 27, 
2011), http://www.ehow.com/how_8655378_photoshop-yourself-celebrity.html. 
3.  See Court:  Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face On Porn Pics, CBS L.A. (June 10, 
2011), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/06/10/court-calif-dad-can-paste-daughters-face-on-
porn-pics/. 
4.  See People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 392 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal. 
LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011).  
5.  See id. at 386. 
6.  See id. at 392. 
7.  See Shepard Liu, Note, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2007). 
8.  See James Nicholas Kornegay, Note, Protecting Our Children and the Constitution:  
An Analysis of the “Virtual” Child Pornography Provisions of the PROTECT Act of 2003, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2129, 2148 (2006). 
9.  Id. 
10.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children To-
day Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 501, 117 Stat. 650, 677 (2003), available at http://www. 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ21/pdf/PLAW-108publ21.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
11.  See id. at 676.  
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The expert’s job is further complicated because repeated transmissions of the 
image from one possessor to another may alter it.12  In terms of time, money, 
and expertise, it has become uneconomical to prosecute morphed child por-
nography, and as a result, only the most clear-cut cases are pursued.13 
This note proposes that California expand its ability to protect minors 
by passing a stricter child pornography law that will overcome the obsta-
cles facing the prosecution of morphed child pornography.  Part II of this 
paper traces the criminalization of child pornography through statutes and 
case law.  Part III argues that the current California laws addressing child 
pornography do not adequately protect children as demonstrated through 
the recently decided case People v. Gerber.14  Finally, Part IV urges Cali-
fornia to adopt a modified version of the Federal Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT 
Act) to account for issues unique to California. 
II.  FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
A.  Protecting Children Is an Objective of “Surpassing Importance”15 
Initially, the theory of obscenity was used to combat all kinds of por-
nography.16  In Miller v. California, the United States Supreme Court held 
that work which was legally obscene was not protected by the First 
Amendment.17  Miller defined obscenity as having three elements:  (1) the 
work as a whole must appeal to the prurient interest when the average per-
son applies contemporary community standards;18 (2) it depicts or de-
scribes patently offensive sexual conduct, which is defined by state law;19 
and (3) the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
                                                            
12.  See Kornegay, supra note 8.  
13.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children To-
day Act § 501. 
14.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 392. 
15.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
16.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973) (“[A] majority of this Court has a-
greed on concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the 
First Amendment.”). 
17.  Id. at 36. 
18.  Id. at 24. 
19.  Id. 
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entific value.”20  Unfortunately, under Miller, the only types of child por-
nography that could be prohibited were those that were legally obscene.21 
As a result, the United States Supreme Court expanded its prohibition 
of child pornography to non-obscene material in New York v. Ferber.22  In 
Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute penalizing the know-
ing promotion of sexual performances by minors for five reasons:  (1) there 
was a compelling governmental interest in protecting children; (2) child 
pornography was intrinsically related to the abuse of children; (3) there was 
an economic motive to distribute it; (4) child pornography had de minimis 
societal value; and (5) case precedent was consistent with the holding.23  
However, the Court noted an important limitation—if a description or depic-
tion of sexual conduct was not obscene, or if it did not involve “live perfor-
mances,” then First Amendment protection was retained.24 
Later, in Osborne v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court empha-
sized the “gravity of the state’s interests”25 when it held that an Ohio statute 
could “constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child por-
nography.”26  The statute prohibited possession of materials of a naked mi-
nor where the nudity was “a lewd exhibition or involve[d] a graphic focus 
on the genitals, and where the person depicted was neither the child nor the 
ward of the person charged.”27  Such regulation complied with the Ferber 
limitation because it narrowly defined the banned conduct and did not pun-
ish possession of innocuous photographs of nude children—like a father 
taking a picture of his child bathing.28  The decisions in Osborne and Fer-
ber established the importance of preventing child abuse in pornography 
and allowed for the prosecution of mere possession of child pornography.29 
B.  Federal Criminalization of Child Pornography Possession:   
                                                            
20.  Id. 
21.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (stating the Court “cannot conclude that the Miller standard is 
a satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem” because obscenity does not reflect the 
compelling interest in prosecuting promoters of child pornography). 
22.  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 234 (2002) (“[P]ornography depict-
ing actual children can be proscribed whether or not the images are obscene . . . .” (citing Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 758)). 
23.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–63. 
24.  Id. at 764–65. 
25.  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. at 113. 
28.  See id. at 113–14. 
29.  See State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 258 (N.H. 2008) (“[Ferber] and [Osborne] together 
hold that a state may proscribe the distribution and mere possession of child pornography.”). 
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The CPPA and the PROTECT Act 
In response to the holdings in Osborne and Ferber, Congress passed 
the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (“CPPA”).30  This statute 
sought to prohibit child pornography but was held to be constitutionally 
overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.31  The Court stated that the 
statute banned a substantial amount of materials that were neither obscene 
nor “‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”32  For example, 
under the CPPA, a movie about Romeo and Juliet or the Academy Award-
winning film American Beauty could be proscribed.33  The statute was 
over-inclusive because it prohibited virtual child pornography where no 
children were used in production, and it banned some works that were not 
obscene.34  For example, an educational video about safe sex with cartoon 
depictions of minors engaging in sexual conduct would be illegal even 
though it teaches safe sex and there is no direct harm to children.35  Specif-
ically, the Court disapproved of the “appears to be” and “conveys the im-
pression” language, which resulted in the overbreadth problems.36 
As a result, in 2003 Congress created the “Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today” Act 
(“PROTECT Act”).37  The PROTECT Act amended the CPPA sections re-
garding the definition of child pornography and the pandering of it, and 
created a new obscenity statute.38 
                                                            
30.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256 and 2252A (2000) 
(repealed 2003) (current version is the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploi-
tation of Children Today Act of 2003,18 U.S.C. §§ 2256, 2252A, and 1466A (2006)). 
31.  Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258 (“[T]he prohibitions of §§ 2256(8)(B) and 
2256(8)(D) are overbroad and unconstitutional.”). 
32.  See id. at 249. 
33.  Id. at 247–48.  
34.  See id. at 234.  
35.  See generally id. at 248 (explaining that under the CPPA if a film contains a single 
graphic depiction of sexual activity in the statutory definition, then it is illegal without looking 
into its redeeming value—like teaching safe sex). 
36.  See id. at 258 (“[T]he prohibitions of §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) are overbroad 
and unconstitutional.”). 
37.  See Chelsea McLean, Note, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legis-
lation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 236 (2007) (“Congress scrambled to enact legislation 
that would pass constitutional muster . . . .”). 
38.  See id. 
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1.  The Definition of Child Pornography 
The CCPA prohibited child pornography in the form of “any visual 
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or 
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct . . . .”39  
The PROTECT Act retains that language and other components of the 
CPPA’s definition of child pornography.40  Both statutes prohibited visual 
depictions where production of the depiction involved an actual minor en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct.41  Also, each statute had a clause that 
punished morphed child pornography (“morphing clauses”).42  However, 
there were significant differences between the two acts.43  First, the CPPA 
had 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(D), which was a pandering provision in its 
definition of child pornography (“CPPA definitional pandering provision”) 
that was repealed by the PROTECT Act.44  Also, even though both acts had 
a virtual child pornography clause, there are significant differences in the 
language used in the clauses.45 
a.  The virtual child pornography clause 
The virtual child pornography clause of the CPPA prohibited a visual 
depiction if it appeared to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
                                                            
39.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000) (repealed 
2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006)). 
40.  Compare id. § 2256(8) (2000), with Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006). 
41.  Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000) (repealed 2003). 
42.  Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000) (repealed 2003). 
43.  McLean, supra note 37, at 238. 
44.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed 
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/PLAW-108publ21/pdf/PLAW-108publ21.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) (including a pandering 
clause in the definition of child pornography (section 2256(8)(D)) that was distinct from the pan-
dering provision in section 2252A, which was also part of the CPPA.  The CPPA definitional pan-
dering provision (section 2256(8)(D)) was repealed, but the CPPA’s pandering provision in sec-
tion 2252A was left intact only to be amended by the passage of the PROTECT Act.). 
45.  Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000) (repealed 2003). 
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duct.46  This clause sought to cover virtual child pornography in all of its 
forms:  wholly computer-generated images, morphed images, and child 
pornography created with the use of youthful-looking adults.47  In ambi-
tiously attacking these forms of child pornography, Congress sought to 
eliminate the indirect harms to children⎯the whetting of a pedophile’s 
sexual appetite, the adverse psychological effects on a child whose image 
has been used, and the use of the images to seduce children.48  However, 
these justifications were dismissed in Free Speech Coalition because there 
was no direct harm to children,49 and the “mere tendency of speech to en-
courage unlawful acts” is not sufficient to ban it.50 
As a result, the PROTECT Act narrowly tailored its definition of vir-
tual child pornography by prohibiting a computer image or computer-
generated image that is “indistinguishable from” a minor engaging in sex-
ually explicit conduct.51  This definition was significantly narrower because 
under the CPPA’s “appears to be” language, a defendant could be convict-
ed if the image seemed to be or gave the impression that it was depicting a 
minor.52  In contrast, under the PROTECT Act, the depiction had to be in-
distinguishable so that an ordinary person would believe that the subject 
was an actual minor engaged in the sexual conduct.53  This new definition 
reaches “substantially less material [than the CPPA] because it requires no 
arguable difference between the alleged image and that of a real child.”54 
b.  The morphing clause 
Under the CPPA, morphed child pornography was criminalized if it 
appeared that there was “an identifiable minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”55  An “identifiable minor” is a person who was a minor at the 
                                                            
46.  See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000), inval-
idated by Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234. 
47.  See Liu, supra note 7, at 14.  
48.  See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995, S. REP. NO. 104–358, § 2(2)–(4), at 2 
(1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104srpt358/pdf/CRPT-104srpt358.pdf. 
49.  See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251 (“[W]here the speech is neither obscene nor 
the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
50.  See id. at 253. 
51.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006). 
52.  See Kornegay, supra note 8, at 2149–50. 
53.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (2006). 
54.  See McLean, supra note 37, at 238 (citing Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)–(D) (2000)). 
55.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000) (repealed 
2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006). 
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time of production, or a person whose image as a minor was used in a 
morphed image where he or she is recognizable as an actual person.56  Un-
der the PROTECT Act, proof of the actual identity of a specific minor does 
not need to be established to meet the standard of proof.57  Section 
2256(8)(C) (“morphing clause”) was not challenged in Free Speech Coal.58  
As a result, the PROTECT Act adopted identical language59 which was lat-
er attacked in United States v. Hotaling.60 
In Hotaling, the defendant cropped the heads of six minors and pasted 
them onto the bodies of adult women engaging in sex acts.61  The defendant 
claimed that the morphing clause was overbroad62 and vague.63  Any “visu-
al depiction [that] ha[d] been created, adapted, or modified to appear that 
an identifiable minor [was] engaging in sexually explicit conduct” was 
prohibited under 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(C).64  The court held that the 
statute was not overly broad65 because “[t]he statute’s definition of child 
pornography ‘precisely track[ed] the material held constitutionally pro-
scribable in Ferber and Miller . . . .’”66  Regarding the vagueness challenge, 
the court recognized that the defendant had “no factual or legal support for 
his argument”67 and that there is “no doubt the provision intends to crimi-
nalize the mere possession of pornographic images of children even when 
the images are morphed and no children [are] actually engaged in the sex-
ually explicit conduct.”68  Therefore, the morphing provision of the 
PROTECT Act survived both the overbreadth and vagueness challenges.69 
                                                            
56.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9) (2000) (repealed 2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256(9) (2006)). 
57.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children To-
day Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9)(B) (2006). 
58.  Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242. 
59.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006). 
60.  See generally United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
61.  See id. at 307.  
62.  See id. at 311. 
63.  See id. at 322. 
64.  18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006). 
65.  See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
66.  Id. (tracking Miller, the statute prohibits obscene material of real or virtual children 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; tracking Ferber, material depicting actual children engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct is proscribed). 
67.  Id. at 322. 
68.  Id. 
69.  See id. at 321–22. 
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2.  The Pandering Provision 
The CPPA definitional pandering provision prohibited visual depic-
tions that “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed” mate-
rial in a manner that conveyed the impression that it contained child pornog-
raphy.70  The “conveyed the impression” language was problematic in Free 
Speech Coalition because it suppressed a substantial amount of protected 
speech.71  The language had the effect of criminalizing the defendant’s pos-
session of material described, or pandered, as child pornography by some-
one other than the defendant earlier in the distribution chain.72  An example 
of a violation is where a defendant possesses a sexually explicit movie and 
knows that the movie is not child pornography, but the box has been misla-
beled by a prior distributor to suggest that it is child pornography.73  As a 
result, the passage of the PROTECT Act repealed the provision.74 
The PROTECT Act’s pandering provision prohibits mere possession 
of child pornography in section 2252A(a)(5)75 and known pandering of 
such material in section 2252A(a)(3)(B) (“known pandering clause”).76  
The problem with the CPPA’s definitional pandering provision is that it 
punished more than just pandering by prohibiting possession of material 
that could not be banned.77  The PROTECT Act’s known pandering clause 
remedied this problem by adding several important features.78  First, it add-
ed a scienter requirement of knowledge.79  Next, it included clear wording 
(such as “advertises,” “solicits,” and “distributes”) penalizing speech that 
accompanies or induces transfers of child pornography.80  Lastly, the de-
fendant must believe that the material is child pornography (and must say 
or do something to show that he holds that belief)81 or he must intend to 
                                                            
70.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed 
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003). 
71.  See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258. 
72.  See id.  
73.  See id. 
74.  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed 
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003, Pub. L. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003).  
75.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (2009). 
76.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2009). 
77.  See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008). 
78.  See id. at 285. 
79.  See id. at 294. 
80.  See id. 
81.  See id. at 295–96 (“There is also an objective component . . . .  The statement or ac-
tion must objectively manifest a belief that the material is child pornography . . . .”). 
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cause someone else to believe that it is child pornography (e.g., by misdes-
cribing the material).82  The effect of these changes is that the defendant 
must believe that the material is child pornography and must either make a 
statement that reflects that belief or communicate the belief in a manner 
that causes another to believe the material is child pornography.83  These 
additions are important because they correct a deficiency in the CPPA by 
criminalizing the act of pandering rather than prohibiting possession of 
protected materials that had once been pandered as child pornography.84 
a.  Testing the pandering provision 
In United States v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court tested 
the known pandering clause by considering whether it was unconstitution-
ally overbroad and/or vague.85  In Williams, the defendant stated in an In-
ternet chat room, that he could “PUT UPLINK CUZ IM FOR REAL” and 
posted a link to seven pictures of actual children engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct.86  After analyzing the scienter requirement and wording of 
the statute, the Court held that the pandering provision was constitutional 
because it only prohibited offers to provide child pornography and requests 
to obtain it.87  In resolving the vagueness challenge, the Court noted that 
the statute had no indeterminacy because its elements were based on clear 
questions of fact.88  Therefore, the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision 
was deemed constitutional.89 
b.  Pandering provision affirmative defenses 
The PROTECT Act was narrowed further with the promulgation of 
section 2252A(c)(2) (“no actual minor defense”) in addition to extending 
                                                            
82.  See id. at 295 (“The [known pandering clause] suggests that the defendant must actu-
ally have held the subjective ‘belief’ that the material or purported material was child pornogra-
phy.   [A] misdescription that leads the listener to believe the defendant is offering child pornog-
raphy . . . may, however, violate the ‘manner . . . that is intended to cause another to believe’ 
prong if the misdescription is intentional.”). 
83.  See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. 
84.  See Gabrielle Russell, Note, Pedophiles in Wonderland:  Censoring the Sinful in Cy-
berspace, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1467, 1486 (2008) (emphasis added).  
85.  See Williams, 553 U.S. at 288. 
86.  See id. at 291. 
87.  See id. at 299. 
88.  See id. at 286. 
89.  See id. at 307; see also Taylor McNeill, Protecting Our Children or Upholding Free 
Speech:  Does One Exclude the Other?  United States v. Williams, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1059, 
1059–60 (2009). 
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the protection of section 2252A(c)(1) (“adult defense”) of the CPPA.90  
These affirmative defenses only apply to those prosecuted under the pan-
dering provision.91  The adult defense protects the defendant if he or she 
can show that the material was produced with “an actual person or persons 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and . . . each such person was an 
adult at the time the material was produced.”92  The no actual minor de-
fense protects a defendant if the child pornography was created without us-
ing any actual minors.93  While the two defenses may sound similar, the 
adult defense does not apply to computer-generated images.94  In contrast, 
the no actual minor defense applies to digital or computer-generated imag-
es.95  In addition, the PROTECT Act explicitly eliminated the no actual mi-
nor defense for morphing cases.96  The distinction is important for morphed 
images because now the only affirmative defense that can be raised re-
quires the defendant to prove that no image of a child was used (i.e., that 
the entire image is computer-generated or only adults were used), even if 
the depicted sexual conduct did not actually occur.97 
3.  The PROTECT Obscenity Statute 
Section 1466A of the PROTECT Act incorporates elements of the 
Miller obscenity test to criminalize obscene images of minors.98  Section 
1466A is an “obscenity statute and not a child pornography statute.”99  
However, it “technically proscribes obscene child pornography,”100 and an 
offender will be punished as if they were convicted of a child pornography 
offense.101  The PROTECT Act obscenity statute encompasses more media 
than child pornography laws because obscene drawings, cartoons, and 
                                                            
90.  See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
91.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2006) (“It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of 
violating paragraph (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) . . . .”). 
92.  Id. § 2252A(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
93.  See id. § 2252A(c)(2). 
94.  See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 237. 
95.  See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that the PROTECT Act’s “no actual mi-
nor” defense extends “‘to most possessors and distributors of these defined materials,’” which is 
to say “any digital or computer-generated image that is ‘indistinguishable’ of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct” (citation omitted)). 
96.  See id. at 318. 
97.  See id. 
98.  See Paula Bird, Note, Virtual Child Pornography Laws and the Constraints Imposed 
by the First Amendment, 16 BARRY L. REV. 161, 167 (2011). 
99.  United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2008). 
100.  See Bird, supra note 98, at 176. 
101.  Id. at 167. 
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sculptures can render a person liable.102  In section 1466A(a)(1) (“pander-
ing-O”) a person cannot knowingly produce, distribute, receive, or possess 
any visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct when 
that depiction also meets the three elements of the Miller obscenity test.103  
Section 1466A(b)(1) (“possessing-O”), prohibits mere possession of the 
same material proscribed in the pandering-O subsection.104 
In addition, both the pandering-O and possession-O subsections have 
been modified to ban materials containing images of virtual minors without 
having to pass the full Miller obscenity test.105  Under section 1466A(a)(2) 
(“abridged pandering-O”), any visual depiction is prohibited if it is, or ap-
pears to be, of a minor engaging in bestiality, sadism, masochism, or sexual 
intercourse if it also lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.106  Section 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged possessing-O”) criminalizes 
mere possession of the same material proscribed by the abridged pander-
ing-O provision.107 
Section 1466A has been controversial because the abridged pander-
ing-O provision and the abridged possessing-O provision were deemed 
overbroad,108 but a later court declined to follow that holding.109  In United 
States v. Handley, the defendant was caught with drawings or cartoons that 
depicted minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct with animals.110  He 
was tried in an Iowa District Court where he filed a motion to dismiss, 
claiming the abridged possessing-O and abridged pandering-O clauses 
were too vague and overbroad.111  The vagueness challenge was defeated 
because the term “minor” provided adequate notice that did not lead to ar-
bitrary enforcement, and because the phrase “appears to be” had a straight-
forward meaning.112  However, regarding the overbreadth challenge, the 
court ruled that pornography could only be proscribed if it was obscene or 
                                                            
102.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (the child pornog-
raphy provision “does not apply” when the media form is a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting). 
103.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1). 
104.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1). 
105.  See Russell, supra note 84, at 1486–87 (stating that only the third element of the 
Miller obscenity test is required). 
106.  18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2). 
107.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(2). 
108.  See United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008); see also 
Marc H. Greenberg, Comics, Courts & Controversy:  A Case Study of the Comic Book Legal De-
fense Fund, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 121, 165–73 (2012). 
109.  See United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1206 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011). 
110.  See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 999. 
111.  See id. 
112.  See id. at 1004. 
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if it used real minors.113  As a result, both abridged provisions failed be-
cause they did not require that either of those conditions be met.114  The 
court stated that these subsections banned some forms of protected 
speech,115 and they were both struck down as overbroad.116  Despite this 
ruling, the motion to dismiss was denied in part when the pandering-O and 
possessing-O subsections of the PROTECT Act were deemed constitution-
al because they incorporated obscenity and they avoided “the same de-
fect[s] as those found in the CPPA . . . .”117 
In United States v. Dean, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
fused to follow the opinion in Handley.118  Dean was convicted of violating 
the abridged possessing-O provision, but as a defense he asserted the stat-
ute was overly broad.119  The court found that the statute was not substan-
tially overbroad because the defendant could not identify a substantial 
amount of hypothetically protected material that the statute criminalized.120  
The defendant and the court could only conceive of a narrow window of 
protected material unjustly punished by the statute⎯“adult actors or com-
puter models [depicting] older teenagers engaged in non-offensive sexual 
acts.”121  Since Handley did not determine whether the statute’s over-
breadth was substantial, the court refused to follow its reasoning and af-
firmed Dean’s conviction by upholding the constitutionality of the pos-
sessing-O provision.122 
Handley and Dean denote a significant inconsistency in the precedent 
regarding section 1466A of the PROTECT Act.123  The abridged pos-
sessing-O provision has been held unconstitutional in one circuit and consti-
tutional in another.124  This is important because the abridged possessing-O 
provision incorporates a truncated version of the obscenity test that punishes 
mere possession of material depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit 
                                                            
113.  See id. at 1007. 
114.  See id. 
115.  See id. at 1009. 
116.  See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
117.  See id. at 1009. 
118.  See Dean, 635 F.3d at 1206 n.5. 
119.  See id. at 1202. 
120.  See id. at 1208. 
121.  Id. 
122.  See id. at 1206 n.5. 
123.  See Bird, supra note 98, at 174 (“Clearly, there is a clash in the interpretation of the 
laws regarding virtual child pornography.”).  
124.  Compare Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (holding subsections 1466A(a)(2) and 
(b)(2) unconstitutional), with Dean, 635 F.3d at 1212 (holding subsection 1466A(a)(2) passes 
constitutional muster). 
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conduct.125  If constitutional, the possessing-O provision will punish conduct 
that does not meet Miller’s test for obscenity.126  Therefore, “it is imperative 
that the United States Supreme Court review the constitutionality of section 
1466A of the PROTECT Act in order to guide . . . the lower courts . . . .”127 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
In 1989, before the United States Supreme Court expressly authorized 
the prohibition of the possession of child pornography in Osborne v. Ohio, 
and at a time when only nineteen other states prohibited mere possession, 
California passed its Penal Code section 311.11.128  The statute makes it an 
offense to knowingly possess information, data, images, or computer-
generated images when production involved the use of a minor who is per-
sonally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct and the possessor knows 
that the person depicted is a minor.129  Child pornography displayed on a 
computer screen is illegal even without knowledge of the corresponding 
data or files on the computer.130 
A.  California Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pictures131 
People v. Gerber exposes the weakness of California’s current child 
pornography law.  Gerber used Microsoft Paint to digitally insert the face 
of his 13-year-old daughter (“J”) onto graphic pictures of women.132  J tes-
tified that Gerber provided her with alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, and possi-
bly methamphetamine in order to convince her to let him take pictures of 
her, sometimes in her bra and underwear.133 
The child told her mother, causing the police to raid Gerber’s apart-
ment.134  The police found two USB drives with pornographic images with 
J’s face on them, but none of the photographs of J in her underwear were 
                                                            
125.  Russell, supra note 84, at 1486–87. 
126.  See id. 
127.  See Bird, supra note 98, at 174. 
128.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (West 2011).  See generally People v. Gerber, 196 
Cal. App. 4th 368, 382 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011). 
129.  See PENAL § 311.11(a).  
130.  See Tecklenburg v. App. Div. of Super. Ct., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1418 (2009). 
131.  Court:  Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3.  
132.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376–77. 
133.  See Court:  Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3. 
134.  Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376–77.  
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found.135  Gerber admitted to masturbating to the composite photos and 
having “sick thoughts.”136 
At trial, Gerber was convicted of drug possession and possession of 
child pornography, with the latter under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 
311.11.137  Gerber was sentenced to thirteen years and four months in pris-
on with a concurrent one-year jail term.138  On appeal, Gerber argued that 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the photos 
did not “personally” depict J engaging in the sex acts prohibited by the 
statute.139  In June 2011, California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal agreed 
with the defendant and reversed his conviction for possession of child por-
nography, remanding the drug charges for retrial.140 
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the statute’s plain mean-
ing, legislative history, and legislative intent, as well as the underlying ra-
tionales in New York v. Ferber and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.141  
Ultimately, the court found that photo-editing a child’s head on an adult’s 
body does not create liability under section 311.11.142  First, the court ana-
lyzed the language of the statute, which states,  
  [e]very person who knowingly possesses or controls any 
matter . . . the production of which involves the use of a person 
under the age of 18 years, knowing that the matter depicts a per-
son under the age of 18 years personally engaging in or simulat-
ing sexual conduct . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .143 
The court announced that the word “personally” means “in person” accord-
ing to the dictionary144 and the word “depict” means “to represent by or as 
if by a picture.”145  Because the court considered these definitions to be 
ambiguous, it compared section 311.11 to prior California child pornogra-
                                                            
135.  Id. 
136.  Court:  Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3. 
137.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 373. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 377. 
140.  Id. at 392. 
141.  See id. at 386 (“We conclude, however, that the articulated rationales underlying both 
the Ferber and Free Speech Coalition decisions compel the conclusion that such altered materials 
are closer to virtual child pornography . . . .  [T]o avoid constitutional infirmity, the term ‘personal-
ly’ in section 311.11 must be construed to mean that a real child actually engaged in or simulated 
the sexual conduct depicted, which is a reasonable interpretation given the legislative history.”). 
142.  See generally id. at 386. 
143.  PENAL § 311.11. 
144.  Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378. 
145.  Id. 
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phy laws including CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 311.2(b) to further 
clarify the meaning of child pornography laws.146 
In 1977, California passed section 311.2(b) to curb the proliferation of 
child pornography, which posed a serious threat to the welfare of California 
minors.147  The law made it a felony to “knowingly send . . . into the state 
for sale or distribution or to possess with intent to distribute . . . obscene 
matter when the person knows that the obscene matter ‘depicts a person 
under the age of 18 personally engaging in or personally simulating’ speci-
fied sexual acts.”148  The legislative history made it clear that the statute 
was meant to prevent the production of child pornography through the ex-
ploitation of children.149  The emphasized terminology was used in the pas-
sage of sections 312.3, 311.10, and 311.11.150 
To the court, the legislative history of sections 311.2, 312.3, 311.10, 
and 311.11 suggested that the law would only target material produced us-
ing real children, where the offender must know that the person depicted is 
an actual child, and the child must actually engage in or simulate the acts.151  
To buttress this interpretation, the court examined case precedent.152 
The Gerber court focused on the holding of Ferber, which supported 
First Amendment protection when non-obscene depictions of sexual con-
duct did not involve live performances.153  Furthermore, Ferber held that 
the state’s interest in protecting children cannot justify restricting materials 
that are made without the use of real children because “virtual pornography 
is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”154 
Finally, the court decided that Gerber’s depiction of his daughter was 
more similar to virtual child pornography than actual child pornography 
because the use of photo editing software to place a minor’s head on an 
adult’s body does not necessarily involve the exploitation of an actual 
child.155  Therefore, the court overturned Gerber’s conviction because pho-
to-editing a child’s head onto an adult’s body is virtual child pornography 
that does not personally depict an actual child engaged in the conduct.156 
                                                            
146.  See id. at 379. 
147.  See id. at 379–80. 
148.  Id.  
149.  See id. at 380. 
150.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 380–82. 
151.  See id. 
152.  See id. 
153.  See id. at 384. 
154.  Id. at 385 (citation omitted). 
155.  See id. at 386.  
156.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386. 
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B.  California Is Behind the Times 
California fights child pornography with section 311.11 and its ob-
scenity laws, but these laws fall short of protecting the vital interest of the 
state⎯i.e., California’s children.157  Gerber illustrates that section 311.11 
fails to protect children from the child pornography predators who would 
be punished under the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”).158  The 
PROTECT Act punishes additional forms of child pornography media,159 
and its definition prohibits more types of child pornography including 
morphed child pornography.160 
1.  Section 311.11 Is Too Weak 
Federal law can punish more forms of child pornography than the cor-
responding California law.161  For example, under California law, a person 
cannot be prosecuted for possession of child pornography in the form of 
“drawings, figurines, [or] statues . . . .”162  Therefore, the statute would be 
inapplicable to “Japanese anime-style cartoons of children engaged in ex-
plicit sexual conduct with adults.”163  However, under federal law, posses-
sion of such material is punishable.164  Possession of virtual child pornogra-
phy is illegal because the PROTECT Act’s prohibition applies to “a visual 
depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or paint-
ing,”165 and “it is not a required element . . . that the minor actually exist.”166  
                                                            
157.  See generally id. (reversing Gerber’s conviction because section 311.11 requires a 
real child in the depiction); see also Bird, supra note 98, at 176 (“[U]sing obscenity laws as a 
guise to prohibit virtual child pornography is insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers to pro-
scribe simple possession of obscene materials.”). 
158.  See generally Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386 (holding that an actual child must be 
depicted to violate the statute); see also Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Ex-
ploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2) (2006) (eliminating the de-
fense used in Gerber in morphed child pornography cases). 
159.  Compare PENAL § 311.11(d), with Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
160.  See United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating 
that morphed child pornography includes images altered to appear to depict minors engaged in 
sexual conduct). 
161.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a), with PENAL § 311.11(d). 
162.  PENAL § 311.11(d). 
163.  See, e.g., United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008). 
164.  See id. (convicting the defendant for possession of a drawing or cartoon). 
165.  18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1)(A). 
166.  Id. § 1466A(c). 
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Therefore, the federal act is clearly stronger because it has comparatively 
fewer restraints with respect to forms of child pornography media.167 
Also, federal law protects children from being victims of morphed por-
nography.168  In United States v. Bach, the defendant was charged with pos-
session and receipt of child pornography.169  The material at issue was a pho-
tograph where “the head of a well known juvenile . . . was skillfully inserted 
onto the body of [a] nude boy so that the resulting depiction appears to be a 
picture of [the juvenile] engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . .”170  The 
defendant argued that his conviction was invalid because there was no abuse 
of an actual minor.171  However, federal law allowed the State to protect a 
minor’s “physical and psychological well being,” and the court found that 
there was an identifiable minor child who was victimized when the picture 
was displayed.172  However, in California, the Sixth District Court of Appeal 
freed Gerber upon his presentation of the “no actual child” argument.173  
Therefore, the PROTECT Act provides more expansive protection than Cali-
fornia’s section 311.11 when it comes to morphed images.174 
2.  Obscenity Law Is a Poor Substitute 
In addition to section 311.11, California has an obscenity law to pun-
ish those who pander obscene material.175  However, there are several prob-
lems with using California’s obscenity law to obtain a conviction when 
child pornography laws fail.176 
California has adopted the definition of obscenity dictated by Miller v. 
California.177  However, proving obscenity is difficult because of the sub-
                                                            
167.  See id. § 1466A(a)(1)(A). 
168.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children To-
day Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006) (defining “child pornography” as “any visual 
depiction,” including computer-generated depictions). 
169.  United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2005). 
170.  Id. at 632. 
171.  Id. at 630.  
172.  Id. at 632. 
173.  See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378. 
174.  Compare Bach, 400 F.3d at 632, with Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378. 
175.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 2011).  
176.  See Bird, supra note 98, at 176.  
177.  Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), with CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 311(a) (West 2011) (“‘Obscene matter’ means matter, taken as a whole, that to the average per-
son, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, that, taken as a 
whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”). 
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jective nature of its elements.178  In addition, there are “demanding imposi-
tions that the Supreme Court has previously placed on obscenity laws as 
compared to child pornography laws.”179  For example, in obscenity cases, 
the material can only be removed from circulation with a prior adversarial 
hearing, whereas in child pornography cases, no hearing is required.180  Fi-
nally, even though most child pornography would likely be considered ob-
scene,181 the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the government 
cannot prohibit the mere private possession of obscene material.182  Subse-
quently, California’s obscenity law only prohibits possession “with intent 
to distribute or to exhibit to others,” which is a form of pandering.183  
Therefore, using obscenity law as a backup to a weak child pornography 
law is “insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers to proscribe simple 
possession of obscene materials.”184 
IV.  CALIFORNIA SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED PROTECT ACT 
The PROTECT Act remedies the shortcomings of obscenity law by 
permitting prosecution for mere possession.185  The PROTECT Act’s ob-
scenity statute (section 1466A) forbids the possession of obscene child 
pornography, even without the intent to distribute, as long as “the visual 
depiction . . . ha[s] travelled by any means of interstate or foreign com-
merce, including through the computer.”186  The Fifth Circuit defined the 
scope of section 1466A when it held that “the mere transmission . . . via the 
Internet is ‘tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus 
constitutes transport in interstate commerce.’”187  With such a broad hold-
ing, it is arguably “nearly impossible to acquire a [sic] material without 
some connection to interstate or foreign travel.”188  Therefore, the statute’s 
                                                            
178.  See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS:  CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 387 (5th ed. 2010) (“It should be clear that the Miller defi-
nition of obscenity provides little more than a verbal screen for a highly subjective judgment.”). 
179.  Bird, supra note 98, at 175. 
180.  Id. at 175–76. 
181.  See id. at 175. 
182.  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
183.  PENAL § 311.2(a). 
184.  Bird, supra note 98, at 176.  
185.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children To-
day Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b) (2006). 
186.  Bird, supra note 98, at 176–77.  
187.  United States v. Moore, 425 F. App’x 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
188.  Bird, supra note 98, at 177.  
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effect is likely to proscribe mere possession of obscene material because it 
is easy to meet the interstate commerce requirement.  As a result, the 
PROTECT Act’s section 1466A(a)(1) (“possessing-O”) provision would be 
a constitutional improvement to California law because the provision has 
the effect of prohibiting mere possession of obscenity.189 
A.  The First Challenge of Adopting a Californian PROTECT Act:   
Narrow Language 
When a law imposes content-based restrictions on speech, it can sur-
vive a First Amendment challenge if it:  (1) serves a compelling state inter-
est and (2) is narrowly tailored.190  It is beyond doubt that the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well being 
of minors.191  However, “[t]he ‘governmental interest in protecting children 
from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppres-
sion of speech . . . .’”192  Therefore, California should adopt a version of the 
PROTECT Act (“Cal-Pro”) with wording that avoids overbreadth issues. 
The first challenge in creating Cal-Pro would be drafting the statutory 
language narrowly so that the statute would survive a constitutional chal-
lenge to its validity.193  Case precedent offers guidance in adopting narrow 
language, and it indicates that Cal-Pro may use language nearly identical to 
the PROTECT Act to pass constitutional muster.194  After all, the provi-
sions that have been challenged on constitutional grounds have overwhelm-
ingly been upheld as constitutional.195 
                                                            
189.  See generally United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at 
*4, *5 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2009) (holding section 1466A(b)(1) is not vague or overbroad).  
190.  IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 332. 
191.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982). 
192.  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002) (citation omitted). 
193.  See, e.g., United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008) 
(holding subsection 1466A(a)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad). 
194.  See generally United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306–07 (2008) (holding sub-
section 2252A(a)(3)(B) constitutional); United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972–73 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding subsection 1466A(a)(1) constitutional); United States v. Halter, 259 F. App’x 738, 
740 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); United States v. Smith, 
459 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5) constitutional); Mees, 
2009 WL 1657420, at *4–5 (holding subsection 1466A(b)(1) constitutional); Handley, 564 
F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding subsections 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad); 
United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding subsection 
2256(8)(c) constitutional). 
195.  See generally Williams, 553 U.S. at 306–07 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(3)(B) 
constitutional); Schales, 546 F.3d at 972–73 (holding subsection 1466A(a)(1) constitutional); 
Halter, 259 F. App’x at 740 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); Smith, 459 F.3d 
at 1285 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5) constitutional); Mees, 2009 WL 1657420, at *4–5 (hold-
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Cal-Pro should use the definition of child pornography found in the 
PROTECT Act’s section 2256, and it should criminalize knowing pander-
ing according to section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of the PROTECT Act (the “known 
pandering clause”).  If Cal-Pro adopted section 2256, it would define child 
pornography as a visual depiction whose production “involves the use of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”196  In addition, the definition 
of child pornography would extend to depictions that are indistinguishable 
from “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” and depictions that 
are “created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”197  Cal-Pro’s pandering provision 
would prohibit knowingly advertising, promoting, presenting, distributing, 
or soliciting child pornography using any means of interstate or foreign 
commerce in a manner that reflects the belief, or in a manner that “is in-
tended to cause another to believe [] that the material” is child pornogra-
phy.198  These words should be adopted because the United States Supreme 
Court approved their constitutionality in United States v. Williams.199 
In Williams, the Supreme Court held in a 7-2 split200 that the 
PROTECT Act’s known pandering clause is not vague or overbroad.201  
The Court also supported the PROTECT Act’s definition of child pornog-
raphy by stating, “[i]ts definition of material or purported material that may 
not be pandered or solicited precisely tracks . . . material held constitution-
ally proscribable . . . .”202  Furthermore, various courts have favorably ruled 
on the constitutionality of the other provisions of sections 2256 and 
2252A,203 making it highly likely that if Cal-Pro adopted identical versions 
of those provisions, the provisions would be upheld as constitutional. 
                                                            
ing subsection 1466A(b)(1) constitutional); Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding subsec-
tions 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad); Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22 
(holding subsection 2256(8)(c) constitutional). 
196.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2006). 
197.  Id. § 2256(8)(A)–(C). 
198.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
199.  See Williams, 553 U.S. at 307.  
200.  See generally id. at 310 (“Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, 
dissenting.”). 
201.  Id. at 285–86. 
202.  Id. at 285. 
203.  See, e.g., Halter, 259 F. App’x at 740 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitu-
tional); Smith, 459 F.3d at 1285 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5)(B) constitutional); Hotaling, 
599 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22 (holding subsection 2256(8)(c) constitutional).  
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Similarly, Cal-Pro should adopt the affirmative defenses described in 
the PROTECT Act to ensure that the statute’s scope is narrowly tailored to 
ending child sexual abuse, although it will be at the cost of some of its pro-
tective capacity.204  Both of the affirmative defenses described in section 
2252A(c) should be employed, because solely having 2252A(c)(1) (the 
“adult defense”) would leave a substantial amount of speech—i.e., comput-
er-generated images—unprotected.205  If Cal-Pro only used section 
2252A(c)(2) (the “no actual minor” defense), then pandering completely 
computer-generated images would be legal.206  However, a great amount of 
material would still be criminalized because the defense is disallowed in 
morphing cases.207  By adopting both affirmative defenses, it is more likely 
that Cal-Pro will be narrow enough to overcome challenges to its constitu-
tionality while simultaneously protecting morphed images of children. 
Cal-Pro should also identically draft the PROTECT Act’s obscenity 
provisions including 1466A(a)(1) and 1466A(b)(1) (“possessing-O”).208  
These provisions criminalize production, distribution, or possession of vis-
ual depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, regardless 
of whether they are real, if the depictions are also obscene.209  In United 
States v. Whorley the court indicated that this language was a “valid re-
striction on obscene speech under Miller [v. California],” and that “obscen-
ity in any form is not protected by the First Amendment.”210  Since the Su-
preme Court repeatedly finds that the regulation of material meeting the 
Miller test is not overbroad, there is a strong probability that Cal-Pro’s 
identical language would also be upheld.211 
However, Cal-Pro should not adopt identical language to sections 
1466A(a)(2) (“abridged pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged pos-
sessing-O”) of the PROTECT Act.212  The same language should not be 
implemented because the United States Supreme Court ruled that pornog-
                                                            
204.  Gray Mateo, Note, The New Face of Child Pornography:  Digital Imaging Technol-
ogy and the Law, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 189 (2008). 
205.  Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 237. 
206.  Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that the PROTECT Act’s “no actual mi-
nor” defense extends to “most possessors and distributors of these defined materials,” which is to 
say “any digital or computer generated image that is ‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct” (citation omitted)). 
207.  Id. at 318. 
208.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A.  
209.  See id. 
210.  Id.; United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008). 
211.  See, e.g., Schales, 546 F.3d at 971. 
212.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2), (b)(2).  
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raphy is protected unless it is obscene or uses actual minors.213  However, 
these provisions are problematic because they are a “truncation”214 of the 
Miller standards for obscenity, and they do not require the material to meet 
the definition of child pornography.215  For this reason, some legal scholars 
predict that these provisions will fail a constitutional challenge.216  This 
prediction becomes even more likely because there is no affirmative de-
fense to narrow the scope of the materials prohibited.217 
Lastly, Cal-Pro would not be significantly weakened by excluding these 
provisions because there is “almost complete redundancy of the conduct 
criminalized by [pandering-O] and [possessing-O] with that of [abridged 
pandering-O] and [abridged possessing-O].”218  The outcome of U.S. v. 
Handley proves this redundancy because abridged pandering-O and abridged 
possessing-O were deemed unconstitutional, while their more complete 
counterparts were constitutional and sufficient to charge the defendant.219 
In summary, Cal-Pro should adopt PROTECT’s definition of child 
pornography, its pandering provisions, and its pandering-O and possessing-
O provisions.  However, it should not accept abridged pandering-O and 
abridged possessing-O provisions for two reasons:  (1) scholarly prediction 
that the provisions will fail because of the Supreme Court’s strong lan-
guage, and (2) because exclusion of the provisions will have minimal im-
pact on Cal-Pro’s protective capacity. 
B.  Cal-Pro’s Second Challenge:  Overcrowding 
1.  Lawmakers Should Do More for Overcrowded Prisons220 
Most likely, California’s legislature will take into account the special 
circumstances of the state when examining California’s child pornography 
law.  Unfortunately, California’s prison system suffers from a severe over-
                                                            
213.  Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240. 
214.  Williams, 444 F.3d at 1296 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
215.  See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
216.  Russell, supra note 84, at 1487 (citing Kornegay, supra note 8, at 2164). 
217.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A.  While this statute has an affirmative defense, it does not 
limit its scope because the statute applies to virtual images including drawings, cartoons, and 
computer-generated images. 
218.  Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
219.  Id. at 1009. 
220.  See generally Ryan Gabrielson, Analyst Says Lawmakers Should Do More for Over-
crowded Prisons, CALIF. WATCH (Aug. 8, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/analyst-
says-lawmakers-should-do-more-overcrowded-prisons-11940.  
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crowding problem.221  The prison system has over 140,000 inmates, but the 
system’s maximum capacity is 78,858.222  The overcrowding in Califor-
nia’s prisons causes “severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners 
through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental health care.”223  
As a result, in Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court ordered 
California to reduce its prison population from 175%224 to 137.5% of its 
capacity within two years.225 
In order to adhere to this Court Order, California has reformed its 
prison system by “changing the focus from incarceration to rehabilitation” 
through its “Realignment” plan.226  The Realignment plan sends non-
serious, non-violent, and non-sexual convicted felons to county jails instead 
of state prisons.227  In addition, after non-serious, non-violent, non-high-
risk sex offenders serve their felony sentences, they are “subject to com-
munity supervision provided by a county agency . . . .”228  As a result, low-
level felons will be subject to local jurisdiction, where the counties are in-
structed to employ community-based punishment demonstrated to reduce 
recidivism, such as mandatory community service, restorative justice pro-
grams, psychological counseling, mental health treatment, and home deten-
tion with electronic or GPS monitoring.229  However, the Legislative Ana-
lyst’s Office (“LAO”) released a report concluding “the realignment plan 
alone is unlikely to reduce overcrowding sufficiently within the two-year 
deadline set by the court.”230 
In light of the overcrowding problem, the sentencing guidelines of the 
PROTECT Act should be modified in Cal-Pro.  Currently, if a person is 
convicted under the pandering provisions of section 2252A for transport-
                                                            
221.  See Five Key Facts on California’s Prison Overcrowding, WHAT THE FOLLY?! (July 
5, 2011), http://www.whatthefolly.com/2011/07/05/us-news-five-key-facts-on-californias-prison-
overcrowding/. 
222.  Id. 
223.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
224.  OUR VIEW:  No Easy Choices on Prison Overcrowding, GADSDEN TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2011), http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20111114/OPINION/111119896/1001/NEWS?Title 
=OUR-VIEW-No-easy-choices-on-prison-overcrowding&tc=ar. 
225.  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945–47. 
226.  California Attempts to Fix Broken Prison System with “Realignment”, WHAT THE 
FOLLY?! (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.whatthefolly.com/2011/10/04/california-attempts-to-fix-
broken-prison-system-with-realignment/. 
227.  Jens Erik Gould, As California Fights Prison Overcrowding, Some See a Golden Op-
portunity, TIME (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2094840,00.html. 
228.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451 (West 2011). 
229.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 (West 2011).  
230.  Mac Taylor, A Status Report:  Reducing Prison Overcrowding in California, LEGIS. 
ANALYST’S OFF. (Aug. 2011), http://www.ccpoa.org/files/overcrowding_080511.pdf. 
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ing, receiving, distributing, reproducing, advertising, or selling child por-
nography, they are subject to a fine and imprisonment for a minimum of 
five years and a maximum of twenty years.231  The same punishment ap-
plies if a person is convicted under section 1466A(a) for distributing, re-
ceiving, or possessing with intent to distribute obscene depictions of mi-
nors.232  Furthermore, if the offender has a prior conviction under 
statutorily defined sections, then his or her sentence is increased to a mini-
mum of fifteen years and a maximum of forty years.233  However, an of-
fender will receive a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of ten years if he 
or she is convicted of possession of child pornography (section 
2252A(a)(5))234 or possession of obscene visual depictions of a minor (sec-
tion 1466A(b)(1)).235  These sentences may also be enhanced to a minimum 
of ten years and a maximum of twenty years for prior convictions.236  How-
ever, sending people to prison for such rigid lengths of time would only 
serve to exacerbate the overcrowding problem. 
2.  California’s Big Chance to Get Smart on Crime237 
Prior to Realignment, California’s reigning policy was “tough on 
crime,” and it did not focus on preventing recidivism.238  The recidivism 
rate is the percentage of individuals who return to prison within three years 
of their release.239  California has one of the highest rates in the country at 
67.5%.240  Since recidivists made up 37% of California’s prison population 
in 2007,241 Realignment’s resolution of this issue could significantly reduce 
overcrowding.  In fact, other states report success in lowering their prison 
populations through alternative programs that have stabilized and reduced 
their recidivism rates.242  For example, an American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) report indicated that Mississippi was able to reduce its prison 
population by 22%, while simultaneously lowering its crime rate over a 
three-year period by allowing inmates to earn time off from their sentences 
                                                            
231.  18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). 
232.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a). 
233.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). 
234.  Id. § 2252A(a)(5). 
235.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b). 
236.  18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). 
237.  See Gould, supra note 227.   
238.  Id.  
239.  Id.  
240.  Id.  
241.  Five Key Facts on California’s Prison Overcrowding, supra note 221. 
242.  Gould, supra note 227. 
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and employing programs that focused on education and reentry.243  Kansas 
used similar reforms to achieve a 14.6% reduction in prison growth as of 
2009, and an 18% drop in crime rates from 2003–2009.244  Realignment has 
already begun enacting these kinds of programs to reduce recidivism.245  
However, California should also implement the ACLU’s recommended 
sentencing scheme into Cal-Pro because the LAO does not believe that the 
current programs are enough to reduce overcrowding.246 
Two reforms recommended by the ACLU that can be adopted by Cal-
Pro are eliminating habitual offender laws247 and terminating mandatory 
minimum sentences.248  The ACLU has suggested that “[s]tates should 
eliminate . . . habitual offender laws that allow for automatic sentence en-
hancements based on prior convictions . . . .”249  Since “habitual offender 
laws overcrowd our prisons,”250 Cal-Pro should remove the sentence en-
hancements mandating higher minimum and maximum sentencing for prior 
convictions.  Similarly, mandatory minimum sentences are problematic be-
cause they can be “strict, inflexible, and often irrational sentencing guide-
lines that . . . [tie] judges’ hands.”251  Therefore, the ACLU recommends 
that states “eliminate mandatory minimum sentenc[ing] lengths for crimes 
and provide judges with slightly more discretion.”252 
Another reason to eliminate habitual offender laws and mandatory 
minimum sentencing is that they are counterproductive to the Realignment 
plan.253  Since it is unlikely that those convicted of mere possession or pan-
dering of child pornography will be classified as “high risk sex offend-
                                                            
243.  Id. 
244.  Smart Reform Is Possible:  States Reducing Incarceration Rates and Costs While 
Protecting Communities, ACLU 1, 25 (Aug. 2011), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreform 
ispossible.pdf.  
245.  See supra note 229 and accompanying text (listing several community-based pun-
ishments that are designed to reduce recidivism). 
246.  See Taylor, supra note 230 (stating that the current plan is unlikely to meet the two-
year deadline). 
247.  Id. 
248.  Id. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. 
252.  Smart Reform Is Possible, supra note 244. 
253.  See generally Post Release Community Supervision Act of 2011, PENAL § 3451(b)(4) 
(indicating community supervision unavailable until after prison term served for high-risk sex of-
fenders); RUDY BERMUDEZ, TODD SPITZER & JAMES TILTON, CALIFORNIA HIGH RISK SEX OFFEN-
DER TASK FORCE 7 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Sex_Offender_ 
Facts/docs_SOMB/HRSO_taskForce.pdf (providing a comprehensive summary of what classifies as 
a high-risk sex offender and the terms of parole).  
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ers,”254 then it is probable that many Cal-Pro convicts will be eligible for 
community-based punishment after serving their sentences.  However, 
when sentence-enhancement provisions “mandat[e] unnecessarily long 
prison sentences”255 and convicted felons are only eligible for community 
supervision after they have completed their sentence,256 then their access to 
community programs—programs that have been demonstrated to reduce 
recidivism—will be adversely affected. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Case precedent established a compelling interest in protecting Cali-
fornia’s children,257 which was undermined when the court overturned the 
child pornography conviction under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 
311.11 in People v. Gerber.258  This controversial decision exposed many 
of the weaknesses of the California statute.  The Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
(“PROTECT Act”) provides stronger protection for children because it co-
vers more types of media,259 and it can succeed in prosecuting morphed 
child pornography where section 311.11 failed.260  In addition, obscenity 
law is insufficient to make up for the weakness of section 311.11 because 
its elements are subjective,261 and the state cannot prohibit mere private 
possession of obscenity.262  For these reasons, this Comment proposes that 
California adopt the California PROTECT Act (“Cal-Pro”). 
However, some provisions of Cal-Pro cannot copy the exact language 
of the PROTECT Act because California must narrowly tailor its language 
                                                            
254.  See BERMUDEZ, SPITZER &TILTON, supra note 253 (stating that factors for high-risk 
sex offenders include:  sexually violent predators, convictions related to two separate victims with 
at least one being a victim of a sex crime, felony convictions for child molestation, felony convic-
tions for a forcible sex offense, and criminal history). 
255.  Smart Reform Is Possible, supra note 244. 
256.  PENAL § 3451(a) (“[A]fter serving a prison term for a felony [all persons] shall . . . 
be subject to community supervision.”).  
257.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982). 
258.  People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 392 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal. 
LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011). 
259.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(d) (West 2011), with Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a) 
(2006). 
260.  Compare Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386 (overturning morphing conviction), with 
United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding morphing conviction). 
261.  IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 387 (“It should be clear that the Miller definition of 
obscenity provides little more than a verbal screen for a highly subjective judgment.”). 
262.  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
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according to case precedent,263 and it must consider the state’s prison over-
crowding problem.264  Accordingly, the provisions of sections 2252A and 
2256, and subsections 1466A(a)(1) (“pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(1) (“pos-
sessing-O”) should be identically drafted because case precedent has upheld 
these provisions as constitutional.265  Nevertheless, the provisions of subsec-
tions 1466A(a)(2) (“abridged pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged 
possessing-O”) should not be adopted because they prohibit speech that is 
neither child pornography nor obscenity according to the Miller test.266  Ad-
ditionally, Cal-Pro’s sentencing provisions should accommodate the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union’s suggestions to eliminate minimum sentencing 
and mandatory enhancements for habitual offenders267 because it could inter-
fere with Realignment’s attempt at reducing overcrowding. 
In conclusion, Cal-Pro will grant more protection for California’s 
children, but it may not be fit for implementation until after the state has 
complied with the United States Supreme Court’s mandate to reduce over-
crowding.268  However, once Cal-Pro is adopted, the suggested modifica-
tions will provide a narrowly tailored law that is compatible with Realign-
ment’s goal of reducing recidivism and overcrowding. 
 
                                                            
263.  See generally IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 332. 
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